This proposal effectively disables the WBTC reserve in the money market, completing the offboarding that began with the earlier reduction of the WBTC supply cap to its minimum. WBTC suppliers retain full access to their funds and can withdraw at any time; existing loans are unaffected.

The proposal executes three actions in a single batch:

1. **Treasury disables WBTC as collateral** — the Treasury (the largest WBTC supplier at ~5.0 of the 7.0 WBTC supplied) unflags WBTC as collateral on its own position, so its other money-market activity is unaffected by the LTV change below.
2. **WBTC loan-to-value set to 0%** — no new borrowing power can be drawn against WBTC. The liquidation threshold (70%) and liquidation bonus (5%) are unchanged, so no existing position moves closer to liquidation.
3. **WBTC reserve frozen** — disables new supply and new WBTC borrows. Withdrawals, repayments, and liquidations remain fully functional.

**Impact on existing users:** No position's health factor or liquidation risk changes. Outstanding WBTC debt (~0.13 WBTC across 13 accounts) remains open and can be repaid at any time, but cannot be increased. Suppliers (31 accounts) can withdraw freely.

**One behavioral note:** accounts using WBTC as collateral *alongside other collateral while holding debt* will be unable to withdraw their **other** collateral (error 57, `LTV_VALIDATION_FAILED`) until they either disable WBTC as collateral on their position (Dashboard → toggle "use as collateral") or repay debt. Their WBTC itself remains withdrawable as normal, subject to the standard health-factor check.


#351 Disable WBTC in the Hydration Money Market